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 In the spring of 1866, the Swiss Federal Council sent Frank Buchser, an 
eminent Solothurn painter, to the United States to sketch the leading personalities 
of the post-war United States. His mission was to prepare material for a large 
mural depicting the heroes of the Union to accompany one that portrayed 
prominent men of Swiss history in the Federal Palace at Bern. Buchser's 
commission was a manifestation of the strong sense of community that then 
existed between the two "sister republics," and its failure to take shape speaks to 
the limits of this imagined community. By the time Buchser returned to 
Switzerland in 1871, the special bond that united the "sister republics" had lost its 
importance. Unified Italy enjoyed a constitutional monarchy, in France the Third 
Republic promised greater stability and moderation than its predecessors, and the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 indicated that political progress was no 
longer the exclusive privilege of Switzerland and the United States. The "sister 
republics'" bond was unlike the "special relationship" shared by the United States 
and United Kingdom following World War II. Their exchanges rarely exceed the 
borrowing of political practices and proclamations of solidarity, but these easily 
overlooked connections speak to an effort to direct republicanism past the 
problems exposed by the failures of the French Revolution without abandoning 
liberalism or republicanism for more radical alternatives.  
 As federal republics, Switzerland and the United States faced similar 
obstacles in their attempts to democratize and centralize political authority. 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the two countries frequently 
appealed to the example of their fellow republic to help guide a course to a 
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desirable form of government and eventually established highly similar political 
institutions long before such arrangements became commonplace. American 
democracy in practice did much to illuminate the tensions between democracy, 
republicanism, individual rights, federalism, centralization and the host of 
problems that arise in popular government. This proved important and fortunate 
for Switzerland, where many political leaders rejected the utopianism that defined 
1848 in the rest of Europe. Their aim was to institute practicable changes 
acceptable to a diverse population and the United States provided the only viable 
example of such a government.  
 Switzerland's adoption of a new constitution in 1848, inspired in part by 
American constitutionalism, strengthened the sense of republican community that 
existed between the two distant countries. Politico-cultural affinity drove 
Switzerland's liberal-radical authorities to immediately establish a treaty of 
friendship, commerce and extradition with the United States, which they did in 
1855, long before contracting similar treaties with powerful neighbors France, 
Austria-Hungary or the German states. When the American Civil war threatened 
the viability of moderate liberal republicanism, Swiss liberals watched with 
apprehension, while Americans appealed to the example of Switzerland's recent 
civil war to understand events at home.    
 What made events overseas seem so relevant to Swiss and Americans 
alike was their then exceptional political arrangements. They were isolated 
republics in a world of monarchies and unstable states oscillating between 
republicanism and despotism. Although their political principles were not 
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identical, there was a similar pragmatic republicanism in Switzerland and the 
United States that balanced or synthesized competing economic, political and 
ideological interests. This was not by chance, as the Swiss Confederation served 
as both a positive and negative model of a constitutional arrangement for 
America's founding fathers. Furthermore, Switzerland's 1848 Constitution has 
rightly been described as the "Verschweizerung" or Swissification of the 
American model of constitutional government.1  
 During the "age of revolution", a variety of republican alternatives existed. 
Rather than a discrete concept, there was a spectrum of republican thought 
ranging from traditional theories of autonomy and collective liberty to liberal 
rights-based notions. Prior to the French Revolution, republicanism in 
Switzerland guaranteed self-rule through the communal authority of the 
collective, but individual autonomy figured only vaguely. This communal 
republicanism, it was argued, was true Swiss liberty and was inherited from the 
primitive Eidgenossen of the thirteenth-century. Despite certain continuities, such 
as the citizen's military obligation and government's responsibility for the needs of 
the governed, the idea that Switzerland's republican tradition extends unbroken to 
the Middle Ages is mythic.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Gottfried	  Guggenbühl,	  Geschichte	  der	  Schweizerischen	  Eidgenossenschaft,	  vol.	  2	  (Erlenbach-­‐
Zurich:	  Eugen	  Rentsch,	  1948),	  416-­‐20.	  	  
2	  Thomas	  Maissen,	  Die	  Geburt	  der	  Republic,	  Staatsverständnis	  und	  Repräsentation	  in	  der	  
frühneuzeitlichen	  Eidgenossenschaft	  	  (Göttingen:	  Vandenhoeck	  &	  Ruprecht,	  2006).	  Pace	  J.	  G.	  
A.	  Pocock,	  Maissen	  rejects	  the	  notion	  of	  "Machiavellian	  moments"	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  
classical	  political	  language,	  arguing	  modern	  republicanism	  represents	  a	  total	  break	  with	  
prior	  conceptions	  of	  democracy	  and	  republicanism.	  In	  this	  argument,	  the	  Old	  Swiss	  
Confederation	  was	  a	  republic	  in	  that	  it	  was	  a	  commonwealth,	  though	  this	  had	  no	  
implications	  concerning	  its	  form	  of	  government.	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 Rather than being an endogenic development as national myth suggests, 
the emergence of republicanism in Switzerland was the product of a long process 
spanning the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Thomas Maissen has 
described, it was from the beginning reliant on foreign influence. Dutch and 
French thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin provided the language and 
ideology employed by the Swiss to justify their assertions of sovereignty. 
Previously, Switzerland lingered in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the Holy 
Roman Empire up to the late seventeenth-century. It was only with the emergence 
of sovereign aristocracies and democracies that republicanism began to emerge in 
Switzerland.  
 Despite varying greatly from one another, the Swiss cantons' 
republicanism at the time rested upon three main points: self-rule, the citizen's 
military obligation and the governments' obligation to the governed. To be a 
republic was to be a polyarchic Freistaat. Individual rights mattered little and it 
remained unsettled who among the populace were integral members of the 
republic, and thus entitled to the full rights of citizenship. Agitation against the 
inequality of inhabitants in much of the country resulted in a populist movement 
that employed the rationalist language of natural rights to justify their inclusion. 
Thus began the modernization of traditional Swiss republicanism, as individual 
rights, popular assemblies and democratic absolutism became its hallmarks. This 
occurred unevenly to be sure, as individual cantons were more or less willing to 
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alter their political customs, but the French Revolution suddenly overtook internal 
developments.3  
 The growing demand for democratization and individual rights coincided 
with the French occupation and consequential collapse of Switzerland's ancien 
regime. For many Swiss, the Helvetic Republic forced the changes they desired, 
but like the French they were divided over the conceptual tensions Pierre 
Rosanvallon identifies as having undermined the revolutionary project. Political 
voluntarism opposed rationalist liberalism, or, if one is less generous, terroristic 
democracy opposed elitist liberalism with little middle ground. In addition to the 
xenophobia that is often identified as crucial to the failure of the French imposed 
experiment, it ought to be added that the troubles that plagued the centralized 
Helvetic Republic resulted from the binary opposition of the two competing 
modes of democracy.  
 According to Rosanvallon, the Terror and the French Revolution's 
ultimate failure discredited political voluntarism and led, in France, to the 
"Triumph of elitist, rationalist liberalism."4 Along with the restoration of the old 
Swiss Confederation and political devolution came the reestablishment of the 
divide between advocates of pure democracy and rationalist liberalism. For those 
who remained devoted to the centralization and modernization of the 
Confederation, there remained one model not tainted by the failures of competing 
extremes: American democracy.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Thomas	  Maissen,	  "Inventing	  the	  Sovereign	  Republic:	  Imperial	  Structures,	  French	  
Challenges,	  Dutch	  Models	  and	  the	  Early	  Modern	  Swiss	  Confederation"	  in	  The	  Republican	  
Alternative,	  (Holenstein:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  125-­‐150.	  	  
4	  Pierre	  Rosanvallon,	  Le	  moment	  Guizot,	  (Paris:	  Gallimard,	  1985),	  134.	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 Maissen suggests the Swiss continually borrowed from foreign models, 
first the Dutch, then the French and, finally, with considerable reference to the 
American model, Swiss liberals and radicals settled on a hybrid republicanism 
that avoided the two extremes of political voluntarism and rationalist liberalism. 
What they most admired about the American system was that it seemed to work. 
Although not a paradigm of an ideal republic, it effectively balanced competing 
interests, respected the individual rights of its citizens, left a measure of 
sovereignty with individual states, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
democratization of the Jacksonian era "gave the lie to the old assumption that a 
democratic country would inevitably degenerate into mob rule."5 The polymathic 
philosopher-scientist Paul Ignaz Vital Troxler was among the first to identify the 
constitutional principles of the United States as a possible antidote to the 
degeneration of the revolutionary impulse in Switzerland following the 
malfunctions of the Helvetic Republic. In 1815, he published a pamphlet 
advocating constitutional change along American lines, but momentum for such 
change was slow to build.  
 The French Revolution of 1830 demonstrated the inability of the Holy 
Alliance to enforce Restoration policies and halt democratic reforms. Swiss 
liberals led a string of cantonal coups d'état that established new governments 
based on popular sovereignty, beginning what is commonly referred to as the 
period of Regeneration. They introduced liberal cantonal constitutions in much of 
the country, took seats in the Federal Diet and pushed for a new federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  George	  Billias,	  American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776-1989 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2009), 142.	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constitution. Various models with varying degrees of centralization were 
proffered, but each canton possessed the right to unilaterally veto any proposal 
put before the Federal Diet, making change practically impossible. The secession 
of seven conservative-Catholic cantons (the Sonderbund or separate alliance) and 
subsequent civil war provided the liberals and radicals with the opportunity to 
enact the constitutional changes they desired. A constitutional commission 
composed exclusively of liberals and radicals was established following the war's 
conclusion. Their deliberations resulted in the adoption of a constitution that 
blended American bicameralism and traditional Swiss practices of direct 
democracy. This strengthened the sense of republican solidarity shared by the 
United States and Switzerland, a development marked by a sharp increase in the 
use of the term "sister republics". 
 The history of the term "sister republics" demonstrates the referential shift 
away from France to the United States that occurred in Switzerland. "Sister 
republic" was first used to describe the client states, like the Helvetic Republic, 
set up by the French in the years following the Revolution. It was occasionally 
extended to include the United States used during the early years of the French 
Revolution, though in this context it expressed solidarity rather than vassalage.6 
After 1815, the term was nearly exclusively used by Swiss and Americans to 
convey camaraderie with their sole republican counterpart.  
 Although Americans were less disposed to proclamations of solidarity 
with Switzerland, they were keenly aware of Switzerland and its republican and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Pierre	  Serna	  ed.,	  Republiques	  Soeurs:	  Le	  Directoire	  et	  la	  Révolution	  atlantique	  (Rennes:	  
Presses	  Universitaires	  de	  Rennes,	  2009).	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federalist traditions. The founding documents of the United States are marked by 
the influence of Swiss philosophers, particularly Jean-Jaques Burlamaqui.7 Swiss 
Historian Urs Hammer detects two competing visions of Switzerland existing in 
the United States from the time of the Constitutional Convention and throughout 
the nineteenth century.8 For the federalists, the Swiss Confederation was overly 
weak and wholly unsuitable for imitation, while the anti-federalists held a 
romantic notion of a peaceful, honest and thriving republic. William Tell was 
central to this idyllic vision of a virtuous Alpine republic, representing patriotism, 
freedom, and simplicity, and he was frequently likened to George Washington. 
Although the federalists were victorious politically, the romantic vision of 
Switzerland held sway with most Americans and was further enhanced by the 
Swiss adoption of a constitution modeled on that of the United States. 
 Little more than a decade after the Swiss ratified the 1848 Constitution, 
the United States descended into civil war. Many Swiss viewed this challenge to 
the federal model of republicanism as a repetition of their own history on a larger 
scale and as threat to the republican experiment. That a war of secession could 
occur under a system the Swiss had adopted in part to avoid just such strife 
caused great doubt in many quarters and the Union's victory was seen as a global 
victory for republicanism, democracy and liberalism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  "pursuit	  of	  happiness"	  as	  a	  natural	  right	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  balancing	  the	  
powers	  of	  government	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  Genèvois	  Burlamaqui.	  See	  Olivier	  
Meuwly,	  Les	  penseurs	  politiques	  du	  19e	  siècle:	  Les	  combats	  d'idées	  à	  l'origine	  de	  la	  Suisse	  
moderne	  (Lausanne:	  Presses	  polytechniques	  et	  universitaires	  romandes,	  2007),	  15-­‐20.	  
8	  Urs	  Hammer,	  Vom	  Alpenidykk	  zum	  modernen	  Musterstaat.	  Der	  Mythos	  der	  Schweiz	  als	  
"Alpine	  Sister	  Republic"	  in	  den	  USA	  des	  19.	  Jahrhunderts	  (Basel:	  Helbing	  &	  Lichtenhahn,	  1995)	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 Historians such as William Rappard and George Müller examined the 
republican bond that connected Switzerland with the United States, but the 
popularity of such histories has declined in the decades since their works were 
published. Though first-rate, Urs Hammer's study provides only the American 
perspective. Marc Lerner, in his recent study of political culture in 18th and 19th 
century Switzerland, details the rise of republicanism in Switzerland, but does so 
without due consideration of the possibilities of republican government 
represented by the very existence of the United States and its political institutions. 
Lerner emphasizes the xenophobia that existed in Switzerland after the failure of 
the French imposed Helvetic Republic, but overstates Swiss insularity and only 
hints at the importance of the United States' example in directing Switzerland 
toward a modern republican democracy.  
 Another recent development in the historiography of Swiss-American 
relations is to emphasize economic connections and to diminish the importance of 
politico-cultural sympathy. Cédric Humair's examination of the origins of the 
1850 Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition Between the United 
States and Switzerland reflects this development. He cites the primary importance 
of the United States as a market for Swiss exports and the significant role played 
by Switzerland as a crucial European entrepôt for American tobacco and as a 
source of much needed finance capital. The diminishment of trade between the 
two countries that occurred in the 1860s, Humair argues, explains the reduced 
sense of republican solidarity that had previously united Switzerland and the 
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United States.9 Although Humair's work adds an important and often overlooked 
dimension, he fails to dislodge ideological affinity as the primary determinant. 
Economic considerations were essential, yet although he distinguishes between 
economic policy and politico-cultural attitudes, he fails to demonstrate the 
instrumentality of ideology. Political ideologies invariably involve economic 
implications and it is to be expected that political sympathy would entail 
economic compatibility and a desire to promote the economy of a favored nation.   
 One critique of contemporary English language literature on 
republicanism is its excessive focus on Atlantic republicanism and the exclusion 
of Germanic traditions from consideration.10 Although developments in 
Switzerland were strongly influenced by Atlantic republicanism, they were 
equally rooted to their Germanic past, as evident in their adhesion to collective 
liberty and the institution of the commune. What the Swiss added to the Atlantic 
tradition were these traditions in modified form. By accounting for this variant of 
republicanism and placing its development in a transnational context, we can 
broaden our perspective to include examples beyond well-trodden ground.     
 The pragmatic republican ideal that emerged from Swiss-American 
discourse and political comparisons was formed across a great distance, 
articulated in several languages, and parochially understood by even the most 
cosmopolitan thinkers. These factors functioned as noise in the transnational 
communication of information and ideas between Switzerland and the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Cédric	  Humair,	  "À	  l'apogée	  de	  la	  première	  perspective	  atlantique:	  le	  traité	  de	  1850	  entre	  
les	  "sister	  republics,"	  Revue	  d'histoire	  2	  (2005):	  147-­‐161.	  	  
10	  Wijnand	  W.	  Mijnhardt,	  "The	  Limits	  of	  Present-­‐day	  Historiography	  of	  Republicanism,"	  De	  
Achttiende	  Eeuw	  37	  (2005):	  75.	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States as it was extremely rare for one to have a sound understanding of 
conditions overseas. A secondary intervention of this essay is an effort to account 
for this noise and to analyze what the errors of interpretation and points of 
emphasis chosen by Swiss and American thinkers reveal about local 
circumstances. Apparent similarities, particularly the belief that both countries 
were at similar stages in a unidirectional progression to modernity, obscured the 
specific contingencies that caused the political institutions of Switzerland and the 
United States to resemble one another. Additionally, the histories of both 
countries were instrumentalized and rhetoricized for local purposes that must be 
accounted for.  
 The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of this republican 
community, its limits as well as its areas of greatest affinity. Newspaper reports, 
contemporary monographs, and memoirs of notable individuals function as the 
basis for examination of the similarities of the two nations' struggles with 
democracy, liberalism, centralization and modernization. The social, political and 
intellectual aspects of Swiss-American intercourse are emphasized, though 
diplomatic and economic connections are not entirely neglected. The first section 
focuses on the leading Swiss radical theoretician Daniel-Henry Druey's 
engagement with American politics in his effort to formulate a workable political 
system for Switzerland. Articles from his newspaper, the Nouvelliste vaudois, 
through which he propagated his political agenda and ideology are analyzed to 
demonstrate how consideration of American political customs informed Druey's 
effort to formulate a desirable and workable political system for his country. Next 
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is an examination of the American Civil War based on comparisons made in the 
letters and memoirs of Swiss soldiers who fought in the United States and 
newspaper reports in both countries. This period witnessed the height of the 
Swiss-American sense of republican community, as their histories seemed to be 
running in parallel, albeit on much different scales. The numerous declarations of 
republican solidarity produced during this time demonstrate that ideological 
affinity, not economic ties, remained the principle bond uniting the two countries 
in the 1860s. The final section is similar to the preceding, though it focuses on a 
single monograph from 1863 comparing secession and civil war in the two 
countries, written by John Watts de Peyster of New York. This work demonstrates 
how the notion of "sister republics" and the affinity it implies survived the decline 
of commercial ties that Humair suggests united the two countries and shows how 
the transnational approach of examination from the outside often reveals as much 
about the observer as the observed.  
 The choice to focus on three separate sections is intended to show how 
Switzerland and the United States came to view one another as "sister republics", 
and then to demonstrate how this identification subsequently informed domestic 
politics in both countries. It is to be admitted that the Swiss experience did not 
occupy the minds of Americans anxious about the future of democratic republics 
as much as events elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, several of the shared 
qualities of the American and Swiss experience made Switzerland a point of 
comparison disproportionate to its size and geopolitical significance. American 
Whigs and later Republicans shared with Swiss liberals and radicals the principles 
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of order, legitimate governmental authority, peace, prosperity, and individual 
rights. Rather than endeavoring to establish ideal republics, they sought to address 
practical problems relating to majority rule, local autonomy against central 
authority, the role of religion in secular society and individual rights. This is 
partly what distinguishes the Swiss and American civil wars from the 1848 
revolutions they are often linked with and can easily be lost when focusing on 
economic influences.  
Daniel-Henri Druey and American Democracy: Lessons in Republican 
Government 
 
 The example of the leading radical and one of the principle architects of 
the 1848 constitution, Daniel-Henri Druey, provides an interesting lens through 
which to examine the influence Swiss perceptions of American democracy on 
domestic politics. Unlike more enthusiastic imitators, Druey's admiration of 
America's political institutions and civic virtues was tempered by both realism 
and localism. While others dismissed the American model solely for its 
foreignness or for ideological reasons, the Hegelian Druey proposed a synthesis 
that localized and democratized American constitutionalism to satisfy the needs 
and traditionalism of Switzerland. It is often noted that revolutions blur the lines 
between practice and ideology and this was especially true of Druey. The 
Sonderbundskrieg presented an opportunity for Druey and his fellow radicals to 
unify the country, but Druey was unwilling to impose a unitary state on people 
whose primary attachment was to their home canton. Many of his liberal and 
radical comrades aimed merely to centralize political authority to facilitate trade 
and the development of internal markets, but Druey's primary commitment was to 
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popular sovereignty and the public good. He perceived the United States as a 
place where sound political philosophy spawned institutions that were on the 
whole admirable, but which did not always serve the common people. The efforts 
of Andrew Jackson and his followers to democratize American politics 
demonstrated the flexibility of the American system and highlighted the 
possibility of working from such a foundation to construct the more populist 
arrangement he sought. Druey was thus able to conceive of adjustments to 
American constitutionalism that reified popular sovereignty in borrowed political 
institutions.  
 One possible outcome that Druey and other radicals were determined to 
avoid was the disappointing aftermath of the July Revolution in France, where 
moderate liberals transitioned from opposition into government and forswore any 
commitment to democracy or republicanism. While François Guizot and Louis 
Philippe could boast of having struck a "juste milieu, equally far from the 
excesses of popular power and the abuses of royal power", Druey's aim was to 
move Switzerland beyond this halfway stage.11 To many, it seemed the only 
legacy of the French Revolution to survive was the centralization of political 
authority and its expanded purview. What Druey hoped was that, like in the 
United States, centralization might proceed under the supremacy of the people 
without overriding Switzerland's traditional local rights. Pierre Rosanvallon has 
observed that in France the period from 1814-1848 represented the triumph of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Guizot,	  Quoted	  by	  Guy	  Antonetti,	  Louis-­‐Philippe	  (Paris:	  Librairie	  Arthème	  Fayard,	  2002),	  
713.	  «Nous	  chercherons	  à	  nous	  tenir	  dans	  un	  juste	  milieu,	  également	  éloigné	  des	  excès	  du	  
pouvoir	  populaire	  et	  des	  abus	  du	  pouvoir	  royal»	  
	   17	  
elitist liberalism over political voluntarism.12 This was precisely Druey's view and 
he projected it onto American politics. He characterized Jackson and the 
Democrats as champions of political voluntarism, while the Whigs were 
unfavorably labeled as elitist liberals. Yet despite his measured admiration for 
American politics, Druey believed it necessary to introduce additional instruments 
of direct democracy to ensure democratization would proceed.    
 In Francophone Switzerland, one of the most important radical journals 
was Druey's Le Nouvelliste Vaudois, the vehicle of his thoughts and a key 
instrument in the popularization of Swiss radicalism. Examination of Le 
Nouvelliste Vaudois' reports on the United States from the early 1830s to 1848 
reveals how political and social developments in the United States informed 
Druey's conception of the possibilities of democratic government. The purpose of 
this section is to recreate Druey's evolving position on republicanism and 
constitutional law as expressed in his newspaper's reports on American events. 
The minutes of the 1848 constitutional commission Druey participated in are 
anonymous, making it impossible to state with certainty which proposals 
originated from specific members. It is, however, widely acknowledged that as 
one of its two authors, Druey's influence on the 1848 Constitution was among the 
foremost and his political ideology informs much of the document.13 
 The "communications revolution" that swept the world in the 19th century 
began earlier in Switzerland than in the rest of Europe. In 1829, when the Federal 
Diet chose to leave regulation of the press to the cantons, a new political forum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Rosanvallon,	  Le	  Moment	  Guizot,	  358-­‐359.	  
13	  William	  E.	  Rappard,	  La	  constitution	  fédérale	  de	  la	  Suisse,	  1848-­‐1948:	  Ses	  origines,	  son	  
élaboration,	  son	  evolution	  (Neuchâtel:	  A	  La	  Baconnière,	  1948).	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emerged as the proliferation of newspapers extended the public sphere deeper into 
the countryside. The young and highly educated radicals were the political faction 
that best used the new communications technologies and their iconoclastic 
platform could only be voiced in a free press. Radical journals appeared all over 
Switzerland and were crucial in catalyzing the Regeneration period and the 
establishment party politics.14 
 After receiving his law degree from the University of Lausanne, Druey 
finished his education in Germany, partly under G.W.F. Hegel at the University of 
Berlin and Hegel's idealist philosophy profoundly marked Druey. His politics 
were essentially a collection of syntheses: nostalgia with rationalism, liberalism 
with nascent socialism, freedom and order, direct and representative democracy, 
and theoretical revolutionary doctrines with Landsgemeinde traditions.15 Like 
Hegel, Druey favored a strong public authority and a free and non-stratified 
population. He came to politics as a democratic conservative, but joined Vaud's 
Liberals in an 1830 revolution to establish a new constitution in that canton. He 
grew deeply unsatisfied with the urban liberalism of his political allies, as his 
democratic idealism clashed with the French-inspired juste milieu the Vaudois 
revolution settled into. He pushed to democratize Swiss liberalism and theorized a 
liberal-socialist synthesis that became the radical platform.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  For	  more	  information	  see	  Meuwly	  Olivier,	  Histoire	  de	  la	  presse	  politique	  en	  Suisse	  romande	  
au	  XIXe	  siècle	  (Gollion,	  Switzerland:	  Infolio,	  2011).	  
15	  Meuwly,	  Les	  penseurs,	  70-­‐74.	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 Druey led the radical opposition to Vaud's Liberal government, which 
remained a strong minority until the Jesuit Affair.16 Like his Liberal opponents, 
Druey initially argued that Lucerne's cantonal sovereignty should not be violated 
and worried about the precedent of resorting to "despotism in service of liberty".17 
When it emerged that in Lucerne's referendum on the Jesuit question nonvoters 
were counted as supporters, Druey performed an about-face as this practice made 
a sham of popular sovereignty. While the Liberals of Vaud continued to hesitate, 
Druey and his radical cohort mustered popular support but proved unable to 
convince the cantonal legislature, the Grand Council, to support the expulsion of 
the Jesuits. The populist Druey denounced the legislature for ignoring the 
manifest will of the people, arguing that the representative conception of popular 
sovereignty was undemocratic. When in 1845, 6000-7000 people took to the 
streets of Lausanne to demand their will be served, Druey and other radicals 
resigned from the Grand Council and led a cantonal coup that established a 
provisional government with its authority based on a modernized conception of 
popular sovereignty derived from the Swiss tradition of the popular assembly. 
They introduced a new constitution that guaranteed popular sovereignty and many 
individual freedoms, including universal male suffrage along with other 
conventional liberal rights.18 Excluding the bicameral legislature and the structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  In	  1844,	  Joseph Leu, the Conservative leader of Lucerne, was convinced that only a militant 
group like the Jesuits could counter the radical threat. Against the warnings of Church authorities 
Lucerne's cantonal government recalled the Jesuits to administer religious education. See Joachim 
Remak, A Very Civil War: The Swiss Sonderbund War of 1847 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 
23-27.	  
17	  Nouvelliste	  vaudois,	  6	  June	  1844,	  «cela	  ne	  vaut	  pas	  mieux	  que	  le	  despotisme	  au	  profit	  de	  la	  
liberté.»	  
18	  Marc	  Lerner,	  A	  Laboratory	  of	  Liberty:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Political	  Culture	  in	  Republican	  
Switzerland,	  1750-­‐1848	  (Boston:	  Brill,	  2012),	  273-­‐288.	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of the Federal Council, Vaud's 1845 constitution strongly resembles the 
combination of traditional and liberal-democratic practices codified in the 1848 
Federal Constitution. Druey subsequently proceeded from cantonal politics to the 
Federal Diet, where he helped lead opposition to the Sonderbund and guided the 
development of the new Federal Constitution.   
 Throughout this period Druey, James Fazy, Paul Ignax Vital Troxler and 
other Swiss proponents of constitutional revision observed political practices and 
culture in the United States with an eye toward local application. Although Druey, 
like other radicals, admired much about American politics and society, he did not 
view the United States as the "City upon a Hill" grandiloquent patriots have 
imagined. Rather the American example served as both a positive and a negative 
model of a federal republic. Druey shared the principles of the Enlightenment on 
which the United States Constitution was founded, but once put into practice that 
constitution produced unanticipated results he deemed undesirable for 
Switzerland. Unlike Troxler and Fazy, Druey's support for the adoption of an 
American style constitution was never heartfelt or enthusiastic, but resulted from 
a combination of his ideological background and practical consideration of Swiss 
political society. 
 Druey personally favored a more unified and directly democratic system, 
but was respectful enough of the people's devotion to cantonal sovereignty to 
reconsider his position. He developed a satisfactory compromise between 
tradition and idealism inspired largely by the United States, where "American 
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wisdom... established theories only in consultation with experience."19 Druey 
understood the United States' Constitution balanced federalism against 
centralization and democracy against liberal individualism in a way that all 
segments of the Swiss public could consent to and he pragmatically tempered his 
political agenda to this end. Druey and other liberals and radicals who favored a 
stronger central state saw in the United States proof that their ambitious schemes 
could be realized in a federal republic. Radicals were constantly accused of being 
utopian dreamers, developing their political agenda on untried theories, not 
tradition and experience as Swiss custom valued. It was with great assurance that 
they could appeal to the political experiments of their "sister republic" to dispel 
such objections. In such articles, the very real parallels of the two countries' recent 
histories are exaggerated to the point that it is clear readers were intended to apply 
lessons to their local situation.  
 During the constitutional debates of the 1830s, America was frequently 
appealed to as “le pays légal par excellence!”20 This impression was due, in large 
part, to the perceived republican simplicity of American politics. Andrew 
Jackson's reelection in 1832 was presented as proof that popular support could 
effectively counterpose the interests of privileged elites, while encouraging 
economic development in a way that benefited common citizens. The radicals 
were thorough egalitarians who believed it crucial to prevent elites, be they 
wealthy merchants, landed aristocrats, or industrialists, from influencing 
economic policy for the exclusive benefit of their class. Fortunately, from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  January	  15,	  1833	  «cette	  sagesse	  américaine	  qui	  n'établit	  les	  theories	  
qu'en	  consultant	  l'expérience.»	  
20	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  June	  24,	  1831.	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perspective of Druey and his fellow editors, they could appeal to the "happy 
people of the United States" as living proof of the viability of their political 
program.21 As George Billias, in his study of American constitutionalism abroad, 
asserts "The Jacksonian movement in the United States... gave the lie to the old 
assumption that a democratic country would inevitably degenerate into mob 
rule."22 Given the Swiss infatuation with precedent, America's ostensibly 
successful navigation of the tensions between liberalism, republicanism and 
democracy were crucial evidence of the feasibility of the radicals' agenda.  
 For Swiss reformers, the American Constitution's appeal was in large part 
due to the fact that it demonstrated the possibility of unifying the country to a 
greater extent than the Federal Pact did without diminishing diversity among the 
states. "We speak of differences in mores, in religion, in language; but these 
differences are found on a much greater scale in North America, and the 
Americans prefer a federated state to a confederation of states" wrote Druey in 
1834 when revision of the Federal Pact seemed possible, hoping to allay worries 
that traditional liberties would be threatened by their proposed constitution.23 
Druey accused his opponents of demagoguery, arguing that reactionaries opposed 
his proposed system because representatives to the Federal Diet would be chosen 
by the people, not because of their commitment to political traditions. He 
continued by equating aristocratic privilege with Southern slaveholding, which 
despite being disliked by the majority of Americans continued to survive. "Like in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  April	  20	  1832,	  «les	  heureux	  habitants	  des	  Etats-­‐Unis.»	  
22	  Billias,	  142.	  
23	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  June	  03,	  1834,	  «on	  a	  parlé	  des	  differences	  de	  moeurs,	  de	  religion,	  de	  
langage;	  mais	  ces	  differences	  se	  trouvent	  sur	  une	  échelle	  bien	  plus	  grande	  dans	  l’Amérique	  
du	  nord,	  et	  les	  Américains	  ont	  préféré	  l’état	  federative	  à	  une	  confederation	  d’états.»	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America" such privileges could continue to exist within individual cantons so 
long as the people willed it and it was "difficult" for Druey and his supporters "to 
be more conciliatory."24    
 For Druey, conciliation was not limited to a qualified acceptance of 
traditional privileges. The radicals were inheritors of the unitarian opposition to 
conservative federalism, but were attuned to popular will which favored the 
maintenance of a high degree of cantonal sovereignty. Happily, as the Geneva 
radical James Fazy wrote in a series of letters to the Nouvelliste Vaudois 
"reconciling cantonal and federal interests is not as difficult as some think." Fazy 
proceeded to discuss the virtues of America's bicameral legislature, a "grand 
example" for Switzerland in which the upper house is designed for the purpose of 
guaranteeing a high degree of state sovereignty through equal representation.25 
America, "in a situation totally resembling" Regeneration era Switzerland, "found 
a solution to resolve this problem" and it was clear to Fazy that Switzerland 
should follow the example. He accused conservative leaders of provoking "false 
shame" in Swiss people, by emphasizing native tradition and rejecting imitation 
of a foreign model, a point Fazy countered by assuring readers that imitation 
would not be servile and was certainly more desirable than the present strife.26  
 Like Fazy, Druey appealed to the Swiss people to see through the 
obscurantist rhetoric of their religious and political leaders in order to appreciate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  January	  09,	  1835,	  «comme	  en	  Amérique...	  Il	  est	  difficile	  d’être	  plus	  
conciliant.»	  
25	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  May	  08,	  1840,	  «La	  conciliation	  de	  l'intérêt	  cantonal	  et	  fédéral	  n'est	  
donc	  point	  si	  difficile	  qu'on	  le	  pense.»	  
26	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  June	  16,	  1840,	  «parce	  que	  les	  Américains,	  dans	  une	  situation	  toute	  
semblable,	  ont	  trouvé	  la	  formule	  qui	  résout	  ce	  problème,	  faut-­‐il	  avoir	  la	  fausse	  honte	  de	  ne	  
pas	  l'adopter,	  pour	  ne	  pas	  paraître	  faire	  de	  l'imitation?	  D'ailleurs	  qui	  demande	  que	  cette	  
imitation	  soit	  servile?»	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how they might benefit from revisions to the Federal Pact. In October 1835, Le 
Nouvelliste Vaudois printed the full text of the American Constitution, 
accompanied by a brief history of American constitutionalism that paralleled 
developments in Switzerland. Druey began by considering the Articles of 
Confederation, which had all the faults of "our Federal Pact", as each state 
"wanted to be sovereign and independent... only seeing their particular 
interests".27 In short, "the American people were victims of the jealousy of the 
diverse state governments and their pretentions to sovereignty."28 Even more so 
than in Switzerland, he suggested, the American confederation was on the point of 
dissolution until the new constitution was adopted, under which the American 
people had lived "free and happy for forty-seven years." America was thus "living 
proof" that states of a confederation "could keep their particular constitutions, 
their laws, their authorities, their finances, their liberty above all, while forming a 
single nation".29 Druey concluded by remarking that the American constitution 
was not without faults and many of its particulars were proper only for America. 
What was to be admired about the American Constitution was the civic spirit it 
engendered, a "frank, simple, consequential and energetic" politics.30 
 Compared with the obscurantism Druey and others perceived in the 
conservative and liberal rhetoric of European politics, the language of American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  February	  10,	  1835,	  «notre	  Pacte	  fédéral»	  «de	  vouloir	  être	  souverains	  
et	  indépéndants,	  de	  ne	  voir	  que	  leurs	  intérêts	  particuliers	  ou	  cantonaux»	  
28	  Ibid.,	  «le	  peuple	  américain	  était	  victime	  de	  la	  jalousie	  des	  gouvernements	  des	  divers	  états	  
et	  de	  leur	  pretentions	  à	  la	  souveraineté.»	  
29	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  February	  10,	  1835,	  «preuve	  vivante…	  que	  des	  Etats,	  membres	  d’une	  
confederation,	  peuvent	  conserver	  leurs	  constitutions	  particuliers,	  leurs	  lois,	  leurs	  autorites,	  
leurs	  finances,	  leur	  liberte	  surtout,	  et	  cependant	  former	  une	  seule	  et	  meme	  nation,	  mettre	  en	  
commun	  ce	  qui	  appartient	  a	  tous»	  
30	  Ibid.,	  «une	  politique	  franche,	  simple,	  consequente	  et	  energique»	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politics was refreshing. Excerpts from Andrew Jackson's 1833 State of the Union 
were reprinted in Le Nouvelliste Vaudois and presented as a model of republican 
candidness. Jackson's forthright accounts of negotiations with foreign powers, the 
sober details and statistics he presented and his open discussion of political 
economy revealed him to be a spokesman of his fellow citizens, unlike in Europe 
where vagueness and deception veiled interests. Readers were implored to profit 
from the example of Jackson and the American people, as they would surely "find 
its immediate applicability to the situation of Switzerland."31 
 The dynamism of American society was also much admired by the 
radicals who were troubled by the complacency of many Swiss. In an editorial 
written in 1835, Druey located the source of this in the fact that in America there 
was a "sentiment that each individual can and must influence... public affairs" 
which gave America a more active "political life than any other country". Druey 
optimistically remarked that in America, the Federal Constitution no longer had 
"any adversaries", as "the two parties known by the names fédéralistes and 
nullificateurs no longer exist except historically."32 All quarters of the country, he 
imagined, were enjoying rising material prosperity and were naturally unwilling 
to harm the government that enabled them to thrive. Writing three years after the 
Nullification Crisis, Druey overstates the political harmony of the United States, 
but he did so, perhaps intentionally, in order to make it clear that the discord 
between unitarians and federalists could be overcome if a stronger central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  January	  15,	  1833,	  «trouvent	  leur	  application	  immediate	  à	  la	  situation	  
de	  la	  Suisse.»	  
32	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  September	  25,	  1835,	  «n'a	  point	  d'adversaires...	  les	  deux	  partis	  connus	  
sous	  les	  noms	  de	  fédéralistes	  et	  de	  nullificateurs,	  n'existent	  plus	  guère	  que	  historiquement»	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government could inspire the same sense of security and promote a national 
economy that tied together the interests of the whole.   
 By the late 1830s, it became clear that if the radicals were to have their 
way it would be necessary to diminish the influence of the various churches 
involved in Swiss politics, particularly in the Catholic cantons. One legacy of the 
French Revolution was an impression of inherent antagonism between 
revolutionary republicanism and religion. Once again, the example of the United 
States, where "the church and the state are completely separated" without "politics 
repudiating religion", served as an antidote to both extreme anticlericalism and 
ultramontanism.33 Although opposed to clerical authority, Druey was nonetheless 
profoundly religious and chafed at accusations of impiety. In 1838 he wrote an 
editorial explaining his position on the desirable relationship of religious and 
political authority. The Hegelian Druey argued for a dialectical progression 
directing the affiliation of church and state through five periods. He lamented that 
his home canton Vaud, the rest of Switzerland, all of Europe, in fact, were yet to 
achieve "complete separation of the state and the church, like in the United States 
of America", where it became established as a central characteristic of a truly 
modern society.34 This line of argument had the twofold effect of reassuring 
religious Swiss that separation of church and state would lead to greater national 
unity and that this next stage of development was not only certain but would 
resemble the supposedly peaceable society of the United States.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  November	  09,	  1838	  «aux	  Etats-­‐Unis	  d’Amérique	  l’église	  et	  l’état	  sont	  
complètement	  séparés	  comme	  société	  et	  institution,	  sans	  que	  pour	  cela	  la	  politique	  répudie	  
la	  religion.»	  
34	  Ibid.,	  «La	  troisième	  période	  est	  celle	  de	  la	  séparation	  complète	  de	  l'état	  et	  de	  l'église,	  
comme	  dans	  les	  Etats-­‐Unis	  d'Amérique.»	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 Eric Hobsbawm wrote of the French and American Revolutions 
secularizing "major political and social transformation", which in recent times had 
been "discussed and fought out in the traditional language of Christianity, 
orthodox, schismatic"35. This is largely correct, considering neither depended 
ideologically on Christianity, but the American Revolution was also not hostile to 
the religions cherished by the common people who made revolutions. Druey 
understood this, and his aim in advocating imitation of America's separation of 
church and state was to keep them from clashing, not to replace religious mores 
with bourgeois values, but to allow them to have their cake and eat it too. 
"Without a doubt, nobody wants to retrogress towards theocracy" Druey 
concludes, so progress it must be.36  
 Despite the best efforts of Druey, Fazy and Paul Ignaz Vital Troxler to 
promote the American Constitution as a suitable model for the Swiss to emulate, 
little progress was made in this regard. In addition to calling them dreamers, 
imitators, and cretins, their opponents also sought to correct their romantic image 
of the United States. When Aargau moved to shut down convents, James Fazy 
wrote about the happy situation of convents in the United States but his opponents 
were quick to point to the growing anti-Catholicism of the American public.37 
Freedom of religion did nothing to prevent religious antagonism and, worse still, 
left religion unregulated, allowing it to fall into the hands of perceived fanatics 
like the Mormons. Meanwhile, conservative liberals argued that America was in 
decline, its golden age having passed with the Federalist Party. What followed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  The	  Age	  of	  Revolution,	  1789-­‐	  (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), 220. 
36	  Ibid.,	  «Personne	  ne	  voudra	  sans	  doute	  rétrograder	  vers	  la	  théocratie.»	  
37	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  May	  11,	  1841	  and	  June	  07,	  1844.	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they argued, was excessive democratization, blind financial speculation and 
excessive materialism. Druey countered by stating that what such critics admired 
about the Early Republic was its "bourgeois aristocratic doctrinarism", the decline 
of which he welcomed. He identified the Whigs and Federalists as elitist liberals, 
inheritors of an "English prejudice... of bigotry and a spirit of oppression" that 
Jeffersonians and then Jacksonians, in the true spirit of the Constitution, had 
overcome.38 Swiss political traditions gave a similar prejudice to opponents of 
centralization and it was crucial for Druey that the Swiss people relax their 
adhesion to outmoded institutions that did not serve their individual interests, nor 
defend their rights.   
 One concern that divided the radicals was the desirability of a powerful 
and vigorous executive, a dilemma made clear in news reports of Jackson's war 
against the national bank. James Fazy's radical organ the Journal de Genève 
expressed unalloyed sympathy with the Democrats in their "struggle where 
popular authority... finds itself face to face with the extralegal pretensions of an 
invasive aristocracy. Is it not an admirable spectacle this man... leading the people 
by the hand to... protect the general interest against the encroachment of the 
interests of a coterie." 39 Fazy's position is not surprising considering the situation 
in Geneva, where the main opposition to radical liberalism was a merchant-banker 
aristocracy. Druey had a more qualified regard for Jackson's Bank War. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  June	  19,	  1840,	  «d'aristocratie	  bourgeoise	  doctrinaire»	  «la	  constitution	  
fédérale	  a	  vaincu	  tout	  ce	  que	  les	  préjugés	  anglais	  avaient	  laissé	  en	  Amérique	  de	  bigoterie	  et	  
d'esprit	  d'oppression»	  
39	  Journal	  de	  Genève,	  May	  05,	  1834	  «cette	  lutte	  où	  l'autorité	  populaire...	  se	  trouve	  face	  à	  face	  
avec	  les	  prétentions	  extralégales	  d'une	  aristocratie	  envahissante.»	  «n'est-­‐ce	  pas	  un	  
admirable	  spectacle	  que	  celui	  d'un	  homme...	  tenant	  le	  peuple	  par	  la	  main...	  pour	  protéger	  les	  
intérêts	  généraux	  contre	  l'envahissement	  des	  intérêts	  de	  coterie.»	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similarly feared the "moneyed aristocracy", but the implied powers that allowed 
Jackson to impose his agenda caused Druey to question the wisdom of structuring 
the Swiss executive similarly.40 While he admired the aims of Jackson's populist 
campaign, the means Jackson employed to achieve those ends were unacceptable. 
The desirable alternative was to empower the people such that no strongman 
would be required to implement their political desires.  
 Druey responded to the conservative refrain that exaggerated the already 
immense powers of the president to denounce Fazy and others for their advocacy 
of the American model by advocating the addition of direct democracy to the 
American model. His vision was much less imitative and more qualified than that 
of Fazy. He even agreed "Executive power, among others, could be essentially 
different".41 But as the constitutional debates continued in the Federal Diet, Druey 
sought a compromise between a vigorous executive and the ineffective assembly 
he aimed to replace.  
 During the Jesuit Crisis of 1845, Druey pointed to the fact that in America 
the executive had proved essential to diffusing internal crises and to the defense 
of the country from outside powers. One editorial declared "in America there is a 
radical party that attempts to weaken and break the federal bonds, and to claim the 
absolute sovereignty of states." In Druey's mind "what saved" the America's 
federal government was that "at its head there is one man... not an assembly 
obliged to demand cooperation." Thus, America was able to stifle the minority 
opposed to a strong federal government, while "In Switzerland" where "the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  March	  03,	  1835,	  «l'aristocratie	  de	  l'argent»	  
41	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  April	  19,	  1840,	  «Le	  pouvoir	  exécutif,	  entr'autres,	  pourrait	  être	  
essentiellement	  différent»	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executive is weak from top to bottom... the ultramontanist party puts in practice 
the theories of the American radicals!"42 While Druey recognized the need for a 
powerful executive to defuse national crises, he maintained that its purview must 
be specifically stipulated, with all residual powers resting with the cantons. 
 Druey by this time synthesized Landsgemeinde practices with social 
contract theory and argued for "the right of the people to exercise their 
sovereignty at every moment", insisting that "Their supreme will cannot be 
restricted by the Constitution."43 Therefore, even if Lucerne was within its rights, 
as Druey previously held, the will of the people was manifest and it demanded the 
expulsion of the Jesuits. Druey was roundly criticized in the conservative press 
for changing his mind and his opponents also tried to turn his admiration for the 
United States against him. Critics noted that America was one of the few places 
where the Jesuits were welcome, to which Druey responded by saying "we make 
a lot of noise about the tolerance the Jesuits enjoy in the United States of 
America. This fact is far from having the value attributed to it." He continued by 
remarking that in the United States, the diversity of religions kept the influence of 
any one faith from dominating, while in confessionally homogeneous cantons like 
Lucerne there was no counterinfluence.44 In the minds of liberals and radicals, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  August	  19,	  1845	  «Il	  y	  a	  en	  Amérique	  un	  parti	  radical	  qui	  s'efforce	  
d'affaiblir,	  de	  rompre	  le	  lien	  fédéral,	  et	  de	  faire	  prévaloir	  la	  souveraineté	  absolue	  des	  Etats...	  
Ce	  qui	  l'a	  sauvée...	  c'est	  qu'à	  sa	  tête	  il	  a	  un	  homme	  et	  non	  pas	  un	  assemblée...	  obligée	  de	  
reclamer	  le	  concours»	  «En	  Suisse,	  le	  système	  fédéral	  est	  faible	  en	  haut	  en	  en	  bas...	  en	  Suisse,	  
le	  parti	  ultramontain	  met	  en	  pratique	  les	  théories	  des	  radicaux	  américains!»	  	  
43	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  November	  05,	  1844,	  «reconnaît	  au	  peuple	  le	  droit	  d'exercer	  sa	  
souveraineté	  a	  chaque	  instant,	  comme	  il	  veut;	  sa	  volonté	  suprême	  ne	  pouvant	  pas	  être	  liée	  
par	  la	  Constitution»	  
44	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  September	  01,	  1846,	  «On	  fait	  grand	  bruit	  de	  la	  tolérance	  dont	  les	  
Jésuites	  jouissent...	  aux	  Etats-­‐Unis	  de	  l'Amérique	  du	  Nord.	  Ces	  faits	  sont	  loin	  d'avoir	  la	  valeur	  
qu'on	  leur	  attribue.»	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single-faith domination could only be moderated by a better integrated national 
culture and politics.  
 The formation of the Sonderbund simultaneously emphasized the need for 
a more unified and energetic national government while creating the possibility 
for its creation. While the Sonderbund was a clear violation of the Federal Pact, 
its illegality alone was not enough to move the remaining cantons to act. In the 
ensuing debates, Druey appealed to members of the Federal Diet to consider how 
the world's other federal republic would proceed, presciently claiming "a separate 
alliance would not be tolerated in the United States" and similarly "will not be 
accepted in the Swiss Confederation".45 Once the Confederation moved against 
the Sonderbund and rapidly quashed its secession, Druey and the victorious 
liberals and radicals moved quickly to enact a new constitution without the 
interference of the ostracized conservatives. To this end, a special constitutional 
commission was elected by the Federal Diet, against the wishes of Druey and 
other likeminded radicals, who would have preferred popularly elected 
representatives. 
 William Rappard, in an excellent study of the Swiss constitution, argues 
that the constitution produced by the special commission was a compromise 
document accepted for expediency rather than conviction.46 This was certainly 
true for Druey, who was obliged to concede a number of points, but it is important 
to note that he succeeded in injecting good-minded political philosophy into a 
document that largely reflected the material interests of the victorious liberals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Nouvelliste	  Vaudois,	  July	  23,	  1847,	  «Une	  alliance	  séparée	  qu'on	  ne	  tolèrait	  ni	  dans	  les	  Etats-­‐
Unis	  d'Amérique...	  ne	  saurait	  être	  supportée	  dans	  la	  Confédération	  suisse»	  
46	  William	  Rappard,	  La	  Constitution	  fédérale	  de	  la	  Suisse,	  119.	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radicals. In one debate he stated "if one casts an eye on world history, one will be 
convinced that institutions that correspond to the ideas and needs of an epoch will 
not fulfill new ideas and new needs" as they emerge. Druey believed that only if 
political institutions were founded on the "most fundamental and most inherent 
traits of the people's character" would they have any staying power.47 He 
continued by attributing the breakdown of the Act of Mediation to its failure to do 
exactly this, and Druey's cosmopolitanism did not insulate him from the general 
xenophobia of his milieu. He was willing to imitate some elements of the 
American Constitution, but insisted that it be supplemented by something 
corresponding with the character of the people, namely direct democracy.  
 In some treatments of this historic episode, the inclusion of elements of 
direct democracy represents a concession to the traditionalist Landsgemeinde 
cantons, but it was radicals like Druey that insisted on these measures. Although 
Druey compromised on some practical points, certain aspects of the 1848 
Constitution ensured that with the passage of time Switzerland's political 
institutions would grow to resemble his vision of a unified nation.  
 Like his intellectual progenitor Hegel, Druey was leery of rapid 
revolutions and their potential to devolve into anarchy or extreme bloodshed. He 
favored empowering the people to proceed gradually toward rational political 
objectives and the structure of the national government following 1848 did 
exactly that. The provisos pertaining to the appointment of the executive (Federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Nouvelliste	  Vaudois, August 20, 1847, «si l'on jette un coup d'oeil sur l'histoire du monde, on se 
convaincra que des institutions qui correspondaient aux idées et aux besoins d'une époque ne 
satisfont plus à des idées nouvelles et à des besoins nouveaux. Si l'on peut distinguer dans les 
institutions des traits plus fondamentaux et plus inhérents au caractère du peuple...» 
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Council) and judiciary (Federal Supreme Court) by the national legislature 
(Federal Assembly) gave great power to the people. In the legislature, the 
members of the upper house were to be popularly elected, while the mode of 
election for the lower house was to be determined by the cantons, it was 
invariably by popular election, meaning all three branches of government 
received their mandate from the people. Furthermore, the judiciary was not to 
review acts of the legislature, as popular referenda fulfill the functions of judicial 
review and in a civil law system judges merely apply the law without establishing 
legal principles.48   
 While maintaining his convictions, the broad-minded Druey continually 
modified his vision for the future of Switzerland. With reference to foreign 
examples he helped Switzerland transition from a loose confederation to a modern 
federal state. Although Druey was not entirely satisfied with the new constitution, 
his determination to create a malleable arrangement that could be modified to 
meet the developing needs of a society is evident in several of its articles 
stipulating the absolute sovereignty of the people. The differences between the 
American Constitution and the Swiss Constitution of 1848 that did not originate 
from Swiss political traditions can be explained by Druey's observations of 
American politics and political culture. For example, his misgivings concerning a 
powerful singular executive informed the decision to divide executive powers 
among seven Federal Councilors. While some dismiss the importance of the 
American model by noting it was only bicameralism that drawn directly from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  power	  to	  review	  laws	  is	  not	  explicitly	  granted	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
Federal	  Constitution.	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United States, it is important to consider the easily overlooked ways in which 
American politics served as a negative example to the makers of modern 
Switzerland.  
 
The American Sonderbund 
 The American Civil War occurred at the height of Swiss-American 
relations. Many in the two "sister republics" viewed the Confederacy as threat to 
the political values of both nations and a threat to mankind's experiment in 
democracy. The Swiss were inclined to sympathy with the Union for several 
reasons, not least of which was the secession crisis of their recent history. At the 
outbreak of hostilities William H. Seward instructed his representative in Bern to 
assure the Swiss "that with God's blessing we will preserve this model of federal 
republican government... Switzerland and the United States shall be honored... as 
the founders of the only true and beneficent system of human government."49 
Melchior Josef Martin Knüsel, then president of the Swiss Confederation, assured 
his American comrades of his nation's sympathy, replying "Switzerland passed 
through a similar crisis fourteen years ago, which threatened to tear asunder the 
then loose connection of the twenty-two cantons... May God grant... that the 
United States may also emerge renewed and strengthened out of this crisis."50 
Reassurances of this sort guaranteed that Switzerland would be of little concern to 
Lincoln's government, but the same was not true of the public. Throughout the 
Civil War and into reconstruction, writers in both countries drew comparisons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  FRUS,	  1861,	  330.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  337.	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between their civil wars and, despite their obvious differences, found instructive 
lessons could be drawn. Many of these writings reveal the existence of a sense of 
republican community and self-identification as vanguards in the historic struggle 
against reaction and arbitrary power. The nature and limits of this imagined 
community will be explored by three means: examination of newspaper reports in 
the two countries, the testimonies of Swiss veterans of the American Civil War, 
and official government exchanges. The first section will focus on Swiss reactions 
to the Civil War, before shifting attention to America, where the example of the 
Sonderbundskrieg was considered by some as a potential model for reunification 
and reconstruction.  
 When news of the commencement of hostilities reached Switzerland, the 
reaction of the Gazette de Lausanne's American correspondent typified and 
molded the common attitude of the Swiss public: "the United States is faced with 
the same crisis we passed through in 1847, in the Sonderbund War. In 
Switzerland, the quarrel was over the Jesuits; in the United States it is about 
blacks. The result will probably be the same: the consolidation and 
aggrandizement of the central power."51 George Müller, in his excellent study of 
Swiss opinion on the American Civil War, identified among Swiss radicals a 
conviction that the Union cause was their own, that the South "threaten[ed] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Gazette	  de	  Lausanne,	  30.05.1861,	  «Les	  Etats	  Unis	  entrent	  dans	  la	  crise	  que	  nous	  avons	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freedom even in their own house".52 This attitude is evident in the Journal de 
Genève's assertion that for Swiss in the Union Army "in defending their new 
country, it is still the old soil of their fathers they defend".53 They understood 
slavery to be the "sole cause of the war" and were not persuaded by arguments 
suggesting tariffs or states' rights were the root of the conflict. Such obfuscation 
had been used to denounce the radicals during the Sonderbund crisis, and their 
unequivocal support for the North stood on ideological grounds. They perceived 
the war as a clash of contradictory principles and part of a supranational battle for 
liberty. The diminishment of states' rights, even if that were the Union's aim, 
would not have troubled them, nor would have the spread of commerce and 
industry the Union's victory ultimately entailed.  
 Common principles also led many Swiss to question the extralegal powers 
Lincoln assumed in the course of the war. The Journal de Genève worried that 
"the grand democratic experiment of our century" might become a "new edition to 
the old history" of republics degenerating into dictatorships, Abraham Lincoln 
another Oliver Cromwell.54 Similarly, the Gazette de Lausanne questioned the 
wisdom of allowing Lincoln to recruit soldiers from the states without their 
accession, to print money at will, and for congress to invest in him the powers of 
"a complete and absolute dictator."55 Swiss radicals hoped the United States 
would emerge reunified, but not at the cost of its democratic principles. There was 
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a sense that America had grown too quickly and in its rush to fill the continent 
had allowed material interests to flourish at the expense of more noble principles. 
For the same to happen at the highest level of its government would be a 
catastrophe for freedom around the world.  
 There were, of course, less sympathetic segments of the Swiss populace. 
Among the Catholic-Conservatives of the former Sonderbund cantons perceptions 
were ambivalent. They were naturally supportive of states' rights, but opposed 
slavery on religious and ideological grounds. An 1864 editorial in the Confédéré 
du Valais argued for the right to liberty and revolution, but maintained that the 
Confederacy failed to meet the criteria of a just revolution as it had not 
"exhausted constitutional means" and did not have justice or liberty "as its goal".56 
Thus while they distinguished between their own recent conflict and American 
secession, they, nonetheless, imagined the American Civil War in the language of 
their own history. In the Canton of Valais, newspaper reports termed the 
Confederates "Sonderbundiens" and emphasized the centralizing force of the 
Union.57 Yet, in none of these places was there unalloyed sympathy with the 
Confederacy. 
 In Zurich, however, business interests completely superseded liberal 
ideology, as commercial security was the paramount interest of the moderate 
liberals of Zurich. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which George Müller classified as 
the organ of Zurich's commercial interests, made little effort to conceal their 
material concerns. They emphasized tariffs protecting Northern business interests 
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as the primary cause for Southern agitation, and already in June 1861, were 
anxious about cotton imports yet to be disrupted.58 Although they referred to the 
Confederacy as a "Sonderbund", analogies with the recent Swiss conflict were 
seemingly avoided, so as not to remind Zurich's residents that many of the same 
principles they went to war for were being tested on the battlefields of America. 
In May 1865, a mass gathering was called in celebration of the Union victory, but 
the citizens of Zurich failed to respond in numbers, leading the United States 
Consul in Zurich to remark "The attendance was large and though but few Swiss 
were present the meeting suffered not at all in consequence, as it is a well know 
fact that most of the able men to be found here are Germans."59  
 Zurichers uncomfortable position vis-à-vis slavery was evident in an 
editorial run in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung celebrating the abolition of slavery. Its 
words ring hollow given that journal's previous stance, and the cause of their 
celebration was the assumption that the Civil War's conclusion augured the 
renewal of the transatlantic cotton trade. A similar attitude was manifest in the 
Genevan Jacques Henri Serment's treatise on the subject of Southern 
reconstruction in which he stated one need not be a humanitarian to wish for the 
enfranchisement of former slaves, as the sooner it happened the sooner they 
would return to farming cotton for export to Europe.60 It must, however, be 
remarked that such sentiments were uncommon in most of Switzerland, where the 
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abolition of slavery was viewed as a good in itself and the Union victory as the 
triumph of "the cause of political and social freedom."61 
 The assassination of Lincoln occasioned a tremendous outburst of 
sympathy from the Swiss people. Hundreds of letters of condolence and 
congratulations were sent from communities all over Switzerland, ranging from 
political leaders in Bern to choral societies in small towns. The people of Geneva 
hoped America would continue to "stretch a hand to the liberties of all peoples", 
while another letter spoke of the sympathy of the Swiss "national heart which has 
ever beat in unison with that of the United States," and with its "great principles 
of free government".62  
 This sentiment was also evident among the many Swiss immigrants in 
America. During the Civil War an estimated 53,000 Swiss lived in the United 
States, with over 50,000 residing in the North.63 Perhaps not surprisingly, their 
perceptions of the ongoing war were remarkably similar to those being published 
back home. Around 6000 Swiss men served in the Union army, mostly draftees, 
though many joined simply for gainful employment or, as Rudolf Aschmann, a 
Swiss Union officer, claimed "Love of the military was an added factor; no Swiss 
can ever stand by idly while shots are fired and trumpets are sounding."64  There 
were, however, others who claimed high-minded motivations, including Emil 
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Frey, a future president of the Swiss Confederation, who later testified that he was 
motivated by the conviction that "The dismemberment of the Union would 
seriously injure the cause of liberty in the world."65 
 The thousands of Swiss who fought for the Union gave proof to these 
grand sentiments. Francis Joliat in Missouri, organized and commanded the 
Fifteenth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, a unit referred to as the "Swiss Rifles", 
who despite the name were mostly Germans. In the Anzeiger des Westens, 
Missouri's leading German language newspaper, Joliat published an appeal to the 
Swiss of Illinois and Missouri to take up arms for "our adopted country America, 
which finds itself faced with another Sonderbund."66 Likewise, Hermann Lieb of 
Thurgau, who rose from the rank of private to colonel and trained a negro 
regiment of 1800 men which he commanded in battle, saw parallels between the 
two wars. The aforementioned Rudolf Aschmann distinguished himself in the 
Army of the Potomac before losing a leg shortly before his term of service 
concluded. Drei Jahre in der Potomac Armee, Aschmann's memoirs of his years 
in service to the Union, is replete with the superficial comparisons of Swiss 
history one might expect.  
 There was nothing ordinary about the Basler Emil Frey's experience in 
America. His story is particularly illuminating as it reveals the limits of the 
affinity between Swiss and American ideals, which, ironically, Frey would later 
be held to be the exemplar of in a 1912 New York Times article titled "How Libby 
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Prison Gave Switzerland a President". Later in life, Frey would contribute to this 
idealized fable convenu by never betraying his earlier apprehensions about 
Republicanism and outright distaste for American society. While living in the 
United States, however, he spared no scorn, referring to the country as 
"Malheurmerica" a portmanteau of the French word malheur (misfortune) and 
America, which was for him a land of misfortune. Frey arrived in America in 
1860 looking for adventure with no real intention of settling. His wealthy father 
was a leading political light in Basel Country who imbued his son with "bourgeois 
radicalism" and a "sense of social responsibility".67 These values were tested as 
soon as he stepped foot on American soil. In a letter home, he informed his father 
"I do not like America and I will and never can like it... I hate this kind of sloppily 
dressed, finger-snotting, spitting, stinking personal freedom... I shall return to 
Europe a confirmed aristocrat". He tentatively identified himself among the "so-
called Republicans", so-called because he likened others' commitment to freedom 
to the "way the farmer loves his cow: when she gives him no more milk, he'll sell 
her."68 "Politics in this country" he wrote in another letter to his family in Basel 
"is determined mostly (only!) by commercial interests" and "the political views of 
the individual depend on the condition of his business".69 His opinions were 
typical of well-heeled European visitors to America, unsettled by the rough 
manners of its people.  
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 Another source of his revulsion to American materialism was perhaps that 
it rubbed off on him. Frey struggled to find work in the United States, travailing 
as a farm hand occasionally and being swindled often by miserly employers. In 
desperation he considered the South might "hold the greatest promise" stating he 
"wouldn't mind–may God forgive... the sin–accepting a position as overseer of 
slaves on a plantation; after all the position of a deputy manager on an estate in 
East Mecklenburg or East Prussia is not much different."70 When the Civil War 
began, Frey joined the Union Army, not because of any principled stance but 
because a family friend, Freidrich Hecker, a German veteran of 1848, was 
organizing a regiment in Illinois and Frey was desperately in need of money. He 
assured his family the war was likely to be over before he finished training, 
though he was indeed eager to "teach the slave barons a lesson."71 He was 
frustrated by the moderation of the Union's initial response to secession and 
absorbed camp gossip to a disconcerting degree. He viewed Lincoln as a 
"dunderhead and traitor" directed by his "secessionist" wife and was convinced 
that "when the contractors and supply merchants have all filled their pockets, 
Seward the fox will come and make peace, and the imbecile traitor Lincoln is 
going to sign it."72 He identified with the radicalism of Generals John Fremont 
and Benjamin Butler and considered their dismissal proof of the Union's moral 
bankruptcy. He even, tongue-in-cheek one hopes, recommended a purge, writing 
to a friend in Canton Vaud "We need a Robespierre, he would be master of the 
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situation. A nation which disavows a Frémont and relieves a Butler of his 
command must be chastised by a Robespierre."73  
 Despite harboring certain misgivings, Frey fought bravely, rising to the 
rank of captain before being captured at Gettysburg. For eighteen months he was 
interned at Libby Prison in Richmond, Virginia, where he suffered extreme 
deprivation, finding sustenance in rats with whom he and two others shared a cell. 
This experienced hardened his already considerable contempt for the South, its 
institutions and, above all, its slaveholding masters. Frey's experience received 
much attention from journalists in Switzerland and the United States and he 
became a symbol of the "sister republics'" kinship. He refrained from 
contradicting such proclamations and perhaps even came to believe what his 
younger self had outright rejected. He never repeated his criticisms of Union 
generals and American mores and, once back in Switzerland, propagated the 
notion that the Sonderbund and American Civil War had been concomitant 
conflicts in the general struggle for freedom and democracy.74  
 In addition to Henry Wirz, the notorious commandant of Camp Sumter 
and one of only three men executed following the war, another notable Swiss in 
the service to the Confederacy was the Zurich-born propagandist Henry Hötze. 
Born in 1834, Hötze's worldview was defined by the political crisis of his youth 
and an early interest in scientific racism. He was a Jesuit-educated Catholic in 
Protestant dominated Zurich and as such was intensely committed to minority 
rights, which in mid-nineteenth century Switzerland entailed an equally intense 
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commitment to cantonal rights. When he moved to Alabama around 1850, Hötze 
arrived already convinced of white supremacy and of the vital importance of 
states' rights in federal republics. As he would later write in response to one 
Mobile Tribune editor's comment that as a foreigner he ought not involve himself 
in American politics, Switzerland "has a system of confederated government 
similar... to that of the United States", Hötze retorted, and "States Rights and 
Federal powers were discussed over [my] cradle as much as over that of the 
Tribune's editor.”75  
 Hötze was, therefore, perfectly suited to propagating the Confederacy's 
message abroad and in 1861 he was sent to England to do what King Cotton could 
not, sway British public opinion. He wrote extensively in a weekly journal he 
created, The Index, and was also published in several local newspapers. He 
brought an elevated sophistication to Confederate propaganda, defending the 
Confederacy with the language of nineteenth-century nationalism, liberalism, and 
Swiss political rhetoric. He portrayed the Confederacy as the political 
manifestation of a distinct Southern nation, a crucial point in his effort to appeal 
to European liberals sympathetic to the notion of national sovereignty. Slavery 
figures as a positive good in his writings, where he argued it would minimize 
social inequality among whites and empower the Southern nation to achieve self-
determination and avoid the "foreign yoke" of the Northern states.76   
 Although Americans did so much less frequently than their Swiss 
counterparts, they also ventured to draw analogies between the two wars of 
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secession. With one notable exception that will be examined at length in the 
following section, most of these accounts were generally superficial until 
Reconstruction, when the Swiss example gained pertinence. The typical wartime 
article resembled one published in the New York Times on May 29, 1861, titled 
"European Precedent for America". This article provided readers with a general 
overview of the Sonderbund War, which it was claimed "Forever put down the 
odious doctrine that minorities may rule." The victory of the "only Government in 
the world which resembles ours in all its essential features" against an opponent 
espousing "excellent Southern rights' doctrine" and the relative peace that ensued 
were held as evidence that the United States could hope for a similar fate.77  
 The Cincinnati Daily Press responded to an outrageous article from the 
London Times that celebrated America's descent into chaos as proof of the 
misguidedness of its institutions. The London paper absurdly suggested "To get to 
days of civil war in Europe, we must go back hundreds of years. It is such a 
spectacle as Europe has not seen since dark ages of history." This raised the hairs 
of the Cincinnati Daily Press who gleefully pointed to the Sonderbund War to 
refute the Times article, before adding "that there is no State in America so purely 
democratic as some of the Swiss cantons" to dispel any notion of America 
violating the rights of its citizens by refusing the right of secession.78 
 Surprisingly few articles on the subject appeared in subsequent years, that 
is until the Civil War's conclusion. Reconstruction divided Americans over how 
to proceed. One gets a sense that people were desperate to find some sort of 
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precedent to guide them through Reconstruction. Most found nothing satisfactory, 
though others latched on to the Swiss experience to advocate their position. Some 
articles written on the subject were well-reasoned, particularly one published in 
Henry J. Raymond's New York Times, that reflected Raymond's moderate 
Republican stance toward the defeated South. It advised imitation of the Swiss 
example where "It was never claimed that the cantons had forfeited their right as 
states to the confederacy."79 Its position was that the longer the states of the 
confederacy were excluded the more profound would become the animosities that 
had divided them.  
 The majority of other similar articles were clumsy works of sophistry that 
reflect a romantic view of Switzerland as peaceful even at war. The most 
remarkable of these was published in the St. Louis Republican in May 1866 and 
reprinted in newspapers around the country. It began with a realistic and accurate 
perspective, noting "The war in both cases was commenced for the maintenance 
of a principle to which a majority... would not agree... the seceders submitted only 
because they were overpowered, and not because they were convinced of the 
injustice of their principles." Accuracy ended there, however, as the proceeding 
paragraphs seem to have been invented out of whole cloth. The author continued 
by suggesting "in Switzerland nobody thought either of revenge or of exclusion of 
the seceders... Here the greater duration of the struggle... created the unfortunate 
and anti-democratic idea of imposing a series of conditions on to the vanquished." 
He continued by falsely stating that in Switzerland everyone was included in 
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drawing up the 1848 Constitution, "Whilst here the war has been used as a pretext 
for the change of a most admirable national Constitution for the benefit of some 
Eastern states." At this time, only the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had 
been introduced, making clear what they referred to as "measures that no 
imaginable force on earth could make us agree to."80 This sentiment was echoed 
and embellished in other Southern newspapers, notably the New Orleans Daily 
Crescent, which admonished the St. Louis Republican for understating the 
generosity of the Swiss toward their erstwhile opponents.81 They practically 
begged to be treated as the cantons of the Sonderbund had been, but in their 
ignorance had no concept of what it was they requested.  
 The Southerners who argued thusly were ironically echoing the bifurcated 
national myth of general unity following civil war established by the victorious 
liberals and radicals following the Sonderbund. It is difficult to blame them for 
doing so, as information on recent Swiss history did not abound, but they ought to 
have recognized the ascendancy of the radicals in the years following the 
Sonderbund. So thorough was the radicals' domination of Swiss politics that it 
was not until 1891 that a Catholic conservative was elected to the seven-member 
Federal Council. Despite being left to manage affairs within their cantons, where 
they were quickly reelected after the puppet representatives the radicals needed to 
approve the constitution had fulfilled their purpose, they were completely unable 
to resist the centralizing state. What some Americans mistook for political 
harmony was single-faction dominance. 
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 It was not only the radical-liberal ascendancy that gave the lie to the 
national myth of post-Sonderbund national harmony. Socially Catholics were 
marginalized to such an extent that one scholar has gone so far as to assert that 
Catholic Conservatives relegated to a "veritable cultural and social ghetto".82 
Ellen Lovell Evans, in a study of Catholic political parties in Europe discusses the 
Kulturkampf phenomenon of the nineteenth-century and describes the various 
misdeeds committed against Catholics and Conservatives following the 
Sonderbundskrieg. In some areas, unscrupulous liberals and radicals engaged in 
gerrymandering and voter manipulation, neither of which would shock Americans 
accustomed to such practices, but much worse occurred as well. Exiles, 
imprisonments, and the confiscation of ecclesiastic and private property occurred 
when former rebels refused to swear loyalty to the Confederation.83 Informal 
censorship prevented Anton Philipp von Segesser, a former Sonderbund leader, 
from publishing a brochure critical of the liberal constitution Lucerne adopted 
following the war.84 What gave an appearance of consent and approval was that 
the victorious party in Switzerland was more unified in their project and rapidly 
imposed its will, while in America radical republicans and proponents of more 
moderate policies clashed incessantly.  
 In addition to the extensive list of oppressive measures that could be 
further enumerated, the most important aspect of Swiss reconstruction Americans 
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advocating imitation of the Swiss overlooked were the indemnity payments the 
defeated cantons, as well as neutrals Neuchâtel and Appenzell Innerrhoden, were 
obliged to pay. A total of several million francs was paid, some by a nationwide 
public subscription that demonstrated a spirit of reconciliation, before payments 
were suspended. The exorbitant costs accrued in the protracted American Civil 
War, combined with the devastation of the Southern economy, led politicians to 
rarely consider war reparations and, more generally the Swiss model of national 
reintegration.  
 In light of the manifest sense of politico-cultural solidarity that informed 
Swiss perceptions of the American Civil War and American's frequent appeals to 
Swiss history for guidance, it can be said with certainty that many in the "sister 
republics" continued to identify as kindred republicans. The notion "sister 
republics" could support rhetoric, and so long as one did not look too closely, 
much could be assumed from superficial similarities. But as will be seen in the 
following section where the writings of John Watts de Peyster are examined, 
seams become visible under close examination of particulars.  
 
John Watts de Peyster: Secession in Switzerland and the United States Compared  
 During the early years of the American Civil War, articles comparing the 
Sonderbund with the present conflict appeared in journals all over the United 
States. Most of these are unremarkable as they present the Sonderbund as less of a 
lesson for Americans to learn from and more as a neat fact to keep in mind. 
Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly most thorough, contemporary attempt 
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to compare the history of the Swiss and American civil wars is the sententious 
John Watt de Peyster's Secession in Switzerland and the United States Compared. 
The scion of a distinguished Knickerbocker family, de Peyster was a noted 
military historian and lawyer strongly committed to the Union cause he and his 
three sons served.85 Originally delivered as the 1863 annual address of the 
Vermont State Historical Society, this polemical monograph is remarkable for its 
absolute and unqualified assertion of the "perfect" parallel between the two 
conflicts, "even to particulars".86  
 His very desire to discover an analogous set of events was born from his 
belief in progress and a set course towards liberalism, democracy and modernity, 
which were one and the same in his mind. He quoted Thomas Macaulay who 
likened "Liberty" to:  
          the Fairy of Ariosto who, by some mysterious law of her nature, was     
          condemned to appear at certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous  
          snake. Those who injured her during the period of her disguise, were     
          forever excluded from participation in the blessings which she bestowed...    
          Such a Spirit is Liberty. At times she takes the form of a hateful reptile...    
          woe to those who in disgust shall venture to crush her! And happy are those    
          who, having dared to receive her in her degraded and frightful shape, shall  
          at length be rewarded by her in the time of her beauty and glory.87  
 
Implied in this tumid analogy is the conviction that liberty, loosely defined and 
understood, would mark the end of historical development.  
 Like Macaulay, de Peyster classified historical actors in two categories: 
those who impelled progress, understood as moral and material improvement, and 
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those who impeded it. This binary informs de Peyster's teleological notion of the 
historical process as a certain progression toward liberty and a rationally ordered 
society. This belief was manifest in his assertion that "human events repeat 
themselves, even as to details".88 The failure of recent experiments in 
republicanism, particularly the Republic of the United Netherlands, a once 
"mighty republic" now "sunk into a third rate monarchy", fueled doubts about the 
compatibility of "freedom in government" with "human existence".89 Fortunately 
for the United States, de Peyster could announce "Switzerland has solved the 
problem on a small scale" and the United States must follow its example, albeit 
"on a grand scale."90   
 Like the Swiss liberals and radicals who modeled their constitution on that 
of the United States, de Peyster was convinced that "Republics... must learn from 
republics" and "the federation of the Swiss cantons is the only one worthy to be 
named alongside of the great American experiment." He dismissed the "Nominal 
republics" of Latin America as "little better than anarchies", leaving Switzerland 
and the United States as the only states worthy of comparison. To this end, de 
Peyster endeavored to deduce "rules and axioms" from the Swiss experience to 
illuminate a path out of war.  The number of parallels de Peyster manages to force 
into his comparison is almost comical. Feudalism is likened to slavery, the 
Reformation to abolitionism, the Free Corps raid on Lucerne to John Brown at 
Harper's Ferry, Huldrych Zwingli to George Washington and he even refers to 
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Zug as "the Georgia, as to location, of the Sonderbund".91 His efforts speak to a 
recurring theme of this essay: cosmopolitan minded thinkers flattening the 
complexities of foreign societies to make them understandable through the prism 
of local experience.   
 Although there certainly were some interesting parallels between the two 
secession movements and civil wars, his faith in their "perfect" affinity was 
formed more by a projection of parochial biases and local experience than by his 
admittedly thorough examination of Swiss history. A Protestant Republican 
imbued with the anti-Catholic sentiments of his milieu, de Peyster was overly 
keen to equate the two rebel groups, viewing the "dextrous, unrelenting and 
bigoted" Jesuits as "not unlike the Southern disunion leaders" in "political 
cunning, recklessness and energy". Untroubled by the fact that secession in both 
cases generally had popular support, he accuses the leaders of both secession 
movements of manipulating "that part of the population... not affected by the 
improvements of the age... who live apart from the civilizing influence of 
commerce and intellectual pursuits" into rebellion.92 
 His equation of the "slavocrat-oligarchy"93 of the South with the Jesuits, 
who are given a role in events disproportionate to their actual involvement, is 
based on a tendentious understanding of the Protestant Reformation, to which he 
attributes all "liberal elevating and regenerating influences", including abolition.94 
He goes so far as to suggest "The Reformation was Anti-Slavery in intent; the 
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dominant church then Pro-Slavery in effect" (italics in original) (27), allowing 
him to associate two disparate factions possibly for the sake of his narrative, but 
certainly to reinforce his moralized reading of history.  
 De Peyster's opinions on the relationships between religion, republicanism 
and modernity were hardly unique. Protestantism inspired a multitude of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century political innovations and social reforms, many 
of which are considered hallmarks of modernity.95 Rationality determined the 
nature of these reforms to a large degree and Daniel Walker Howe and other 
scholars argue that the sense of individual autonomy Protestantism fostered was 
responsible for this and "issues of morality and religion were built into the second 
party system from its inception". It is therefore a mistake, albeit a common one, to 
dismiss the role of ideology as a determinant of political allegiance in antebellum 
American.96 
 This link, though often overlooked today, was evident at the time, 
particularly to Alexis de Tocqueville. He detected in the beliefs of American 
Protestants "a form of Christianty which" he could not "better describe than by 
styling it a democratic and republican religion." Its tendency was to behave as if 
"every principle of the moral world is fixed and determinate, although the 
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political world is abandoned to the debates and experiments of men." The 
products of these debates and experiments were rationally constructed policies 
rooted in fixed morality, not determined by a religious authority as many 
imagined the politics of Catholics to be. Thus, as their political ideology 
originated from their religious morals "Americans combine the notions of 
Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to 
make them conceive the one without the other."97  
 Many of the leading political issues of the nineteenth century were related 
to economic policy, matters which Calvin, Luther, and the Bible were largely 
silent on. Protestants were, therefore, free to rationalize their own political and 
economic order. And order it was, for they largely supported the Whig's 
American system, which Howe asserts was logical, for, like their faith, it gave 
order to the economy, directing the energies of American society toward a 
consciously planned goal, in contrast to the rather haphazard laissez-faire policies 
of the Democrats. The dominant forms of nineteenth century Protestantism 
emphasized the need for individuals to take control of their lives and it was only 
natural that their political expression was active support for planned economic 
growth.  
 The cultural values Howe and others identify with Whiggery, and later 
Republicanism, such as the emphasis placed on the cosmopolitan and national 
over the local, rationalized order over traditional customs and irrational 
spontaneity, and prioritizing individual autonomy over communal rights were 
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linked to a Protestant notion of personal salvation. As Howe describes it 
"Voluntary discipline represented Protestantism's alternative to the 
authoritarianism of traditional society".98 De Peyster's writings reflect a sense that 
in the North people were furthering progress through mastery of their passions, 
while Southern slavery spoke to the hedonism of a dissipating society. Thus, what 
de Peyster and other Republican reformers regarded as moral discipline 
Southerners equated to tyranny. 
 Many Protestants in Europe and in North America regarded Catholicism 
as a menace to true Christianity, not as an acceptable alternative denomination. 
Catholics' acceptance of received religious authority led to questions about their 
ability to adapt to a political system that demanded the exercise of individual 
conscience. Furthermore, like many Americans at the time, de Peyster imagined 
Catholics to be part of an anti-democratic conspiracy against modernity, 
incommensurate with the Catholic Church's actual opposition to liberalism and 
democracy. To understand the religious antagonism that was still intense in the 
nineteenth century, one must keep in mind that de Peyster was a man 
contemptuous of all things Catholic who harbored a three hundred-year-old 
grudge over the dispersal of Zwingli's ashes to the wind "mixed with those of 
swine".99 It was thus with ease that he positioned Catholic Swiss with the 
infinitely more reprehensible slaveholders of the American South as "enemies of 
progress".100 For de Peyster "Switzerland presented a perfect picture of the Status 
of Romanism and Retrograde Tendencies and Protestantism and Liberal 
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Progression".101 Substitute "Romanism" for Confederacy and "Protestantism" for 
Union, as de Peyster hoped his audience would, and one sees how he managed to 
project the political issues of his time, namely abolition, anti-Catholicism, and 
economic development onto a situation where they were only partly applicable.  
 De Peyster's conviction of the "civilizing influence of commerce" and 
admiration for Zurich as "the cradle of the reformation" blinds him to the attitude 
of the majority of Zurichers toward the Union cause. George Müller noted in his 
study of Swiss public opinion toward the American Civil War, that the moderate 
Liberals of Zurich were the sole non-Catholic group sympathetic to the 
Confederacy. Like the Copperheads in de Peyster's native New York, the financial 
interests of Zurich's merchants and industrialists were tied up with the cotton 
trade and the interruption of that trade led to some economic hardship. They 
hoped that an independent South would endorse a policy of free trade and do 
away with the protectionism of the North and their economic concerns superseded 
whatever disquiet they had regarding support for a slave society. De Peyster 
spares no scorn for similarly minded urban New Yorkers, whose selfishness he 
contrasts with the men of "rural New York... true as steel to the Constitution and 
Union". Yet in ignorance he held Zurich as Switzerland's "home of liberal ideas". 
Thus, he overlooks an interesting parallel that demonstrates how some of the 
Swiss liberals de Peyster so admired were not nearly as high-minded as he fancied 
them to be.  
 De Peyster's enthusiasm for drawing parallels truly gets the better of him 
when he asserts that "Just as this Reaction in religious and political matters, 
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permitted in certain Cantons, sought to invade and rule in more Liberal Cantons, 
just so Slavery endeavored to invade the Free States and impose and continue a 
succession of corrupt administrations upon our free North"102 and "Spiritual 
avarice, if the term be admissable [sic], lent that vigor to the Sonderbund that the 
thirst for material wealth... had infused into the lords and champions of 
Cottondom."103 As discussed above, the Sonderbund's very reason for being was 
to refute the notion that a canton's internal affairs could be interfered with by its 
confederates. In no way did they intend to impose their religion on Protestant 
Swiss and some of their number were in fact Protestant, yet de Peyster forces 
them into the mold of the secessionists he knew best.   
 As a military historian, de Peyster had much to say on the practical 
execution of the American Civil War and the lessons that could be drawn from 
Switzerland. Switzerland and its militias were a pet interest of his. He wrote 
extensively on the subject, publishing essays in the Army and Navy Journal and 
elsewhere, and also attempted to reform the New York State Militia according to 
the Swiss example.104 The Sonderbund was, for de Peyster, instructive in two 
ways: it showed the value of "a Militia so admirably organized" that it could 
rapidly quash a rebellion and demonstrated that only a hard-fought victory of 
patriotic citizen soldiers would allow the nation to cherish more dearly the 
freedoms for which they fought. This second point was especially pertinent to 
America in 1863, as de Peyster cautioned against "the organization of a 
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disproportionate army of blacks" which would be "unworthy of a free people". He 
was not categorically opposed to the inclusion of blacks in the Union Army and in 
fact credited himself with being "the first, in print, to suggest their organization"; 
rather he was "opposed to a negro army outnumbering that composed of whites." 
He allowed that "The rough edge of the work may be taken off by our black 
auxiliaries", but for Americans to appreciate the significance of the freedoms they 
were fighting for "the finishing touches must be put on by ourselves, by our white 
brethren".105  
 Despite being an abolitionist, de Peyster's concept of the American nation 
excluded blacks who, even in the uniform of the Union Army, would remain 
"hireling hands". It is likely that his exclusion of blacks from the American nation 
is what allows him to be so convinced of the perfect similarity of the two wars. 
Americans were divided over the Union's aims in fighting the civil war and, like 
many of his compatriots, de Peyster prioritized reunification and abolition, but, at 
least in 1863, he could not imagine the inclusion of millions of former slaves in 
the American body politic. He recognized the evil of slavery, but his primary 
concern was its "fatal influences... upon our free institutions".106 In his mind, 
slavery was similar to Catholicism in that both impeded the flourishing of 
democratic institutions and inhibited civic virtues from taking root. In his 
statements regarding enlistment of blacks, de Peyster articulates a particular line 
of Free Soil ideology that emphasized the demoralizing effects of slavery on 
masters. He extends this thinking to the military in arguing that to enlist former 
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slaves to fight the Union cause would subject all Americans to the moral 
dissipation that prevented the majority of Southerners from becoming virtuous 
citizens of the Union.  
 Ironically, de Peyster's ascribes a similar notion of republican virtue to all 
of Switzerland, while in reality it was a notion of Freiheit received from the 
primitive Swiss cantons. De Peyster uncritically accepted a concept of 
republicanism that Marc Lerner describes as the "perceived ancient link between 
military service, citizenship and public virtue" without recognizing it was part of 
an ethical system he viewed as outmoded and counterprogressive.107 In every 
Swiss canton there was a similar conception of citizens' martial duty, but outside 
the Landsgemeinde cantons this duty more closely resembled Rousseau's social 
contract theory, which it partly inspired, not the semi-mythical notion of freedom 
granted by God and maintained by virtuous behavior rewarded on the battlefield. 
De Peyster was trapped somewhere between these two models, as his religiosity 
lent him faith in Providential deliverance, while his liberalism privileged 
individuals' responsibility. Thus, despite being a self-proclaimed republican, his 
thought was essentially antithetical to communal aspects of republicanism, as his 
support for a modern state composed of atomized individuals was opposed the 
conservative concept of republicanism that led to the Sonderbund and the 
Confederacy.     
 De Peyster was similarly of two minds in his understanding of progress, 
vacillating between faith in its inevitability and dread that those who aimed to halt 
what could not be resisted might succeed. His main purpose in drawing attention 
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to the Swiss experience was to reassure loyal Americans that their struggle would 
be rewarded. He had faith that "Providence" would "conduct our affairs to the 
same happy result he vouchsafed in the case of the Swiss" and perceived the 
Sonderbund and the Confederacy as intent on halting "the progress of the age" 
and on restoring "abuses for the benefit of the few to the suffering of the many". 
In Switzerland, their efforts "had a directly opposite result" and he was confident 
that "The fiery trial through which we as a people are now passing, will eventuate 
not only in a restored UNITY, but if need be, in a STRONGER DEMOCRATIC-
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, better fitted to perform its great work, and hold 
its commanding position among the Nations." (72) For de Peyster, the Swiss 
example was proof that ardent patriotism would overcome sectional zeal.  
 Much of de Peyster's argument strikes modern readers as hyperbolic, but 
his contemporaries praised his perceptiveness. A reviewer in the New York Times 
called it a "comprehensive and learned monograph" and found solace in de 
Peytser's argument that the "occasional license and sporadic excesses of liberal 
institutions should neither disgust nor discourage thinking men."108 This was an 
important lesson for American's anxious lest their republic be shattered. That de 
Peyster and his audience were imperceptive of the significant differences of the 
two wars of secession and their causes was irrelevant, for in both countries 
perception served the role of reality. 
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Conclusion 
 In the fall of 1866, Swiss authorities were worried their country might 
somehow be drawn into the Austro-Prussian War. Although the Congress of 
Vienna guaranteed Switzerland’s neutrality, European powers continually 
interfered in Swiss internal affairs over the subsequent fifty years. As anxieties 
mounted, an editorial appeared in Der Bund, the semiofficial newspaper of Bern, 
which considered the possibility of seeking foreign alliances. It concluded that 
Switzerland "would find the most efficacious succor on the other side of the 
Atlantic... the American Union has a real interest in maintaining the only republic 
which exists in Europe. That could be a sufficient reason for extending her 
Monroe Doctrine to Switzerland."109 This extraordinary proclamation was an 
expression of a belief in republican solidarity and of the affinity between Swiss 
radical ideology and American political practices. For the United States, it was 
impossible to imagine extending the Monroe Doctrine to Europe, as it was merely 
as examples of the practical possibilities of republican government that 
Switzerland and the United States functioned as "sister republics".  
 As the exceptionalism of their political arrangements diminished with the 
proliferation of republics, there continued to be some exchange of political 
practices between the two countries. Several American states adopted referenda 
and plebiscites in direct imitation of the Swiss and American influence largely 
decided the placement of the League of Nations in Geneva.110 Although none of 
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these exchanges warrant a total reconsideration of the Age of Revolutions or a 
wholly unique republican ideology, they do reveal that the two countries shared 
more than merely a bicameral legislature. They represented a practical republican 
alternative that endures to this day. In this light, one can hardly consider the 
history of either country as divorced from larger historical trends that shaped the 
modernity elsewhere. By placing Swiss and American history in transnational 
context, notions of American exceptionalism and the old joke about Switzerland 
being an island surrounded by land are exposed as false. The two countries had 
distinct political cultures, but similar circumstances made them more alike than is 
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